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Abstract
Typically authors explain how they conduct Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), but fail to explain how they ensured that their analytical process was trustworthy. For example, a minority mention that they ‘reached consensus’ after having engaged in a shared analysis of the data, but do not explain how they did so. In this article we report on our experience of engaging in a shared analysis and aim to stimulate discussion about the process of ensuring the trustworthiness of one’s data when employing IPA. Our key recommendation is that all researchers involved in analysis should listen to the audio recordings; failure to do so increases the potential for researchers to superimpose their own presuppositions or interpretative bias onto the data. We also suggest that audio recordings should be kept for a longer duration in case secondary analysis is required. We finish our article with a series of tips developed from our experience of shared analysis. 
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Lost in Transcription: Exploring analytical trustworthiness and the process of reaching consensus in Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis

Introduction
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was developed as a distinctive approach to conducting qualitative research and is becoming increasingly popular (Brocki & Wearden, 2006). Its origins are detailed in Smith (1996) and although the analytical process is described in a variety of papers (e.g. Smith & Dunworth, 2003; Smith & Eatough, 2007; Smith, Jarman & Osborn, 1999; Smith & Osborn, 2004, 2008; Willig, 2001), Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009) clearly state that they do not consider it appropriate to provide a prescriptive method for IPA. They acknowledge that engaging in IPA is both challenging and complex, not least because “there is no clear right or wrong way of conducting this sort of analysis” (Smith et al., 2009: 80). Such a position is an uncomfortable one both for those using IPA and for those trying to assess the quality of IPA research. 

At the heart of IPA is an assumption that participants attempt to interpret their own experiences in a way which is understandable to them, and in so doing, try to convey their experiences in a manner which is understandable to the researcher, (Chapman & Smith, 2002). Clarke (2009:38) highlights that IPA recognises that the process of understanding someone else’s life world or experience(s) is inevitably influenced by the researchers own “experiences, values and pre-understandings”. This process is known as the “double hermeneutic”: a researcher trying to make sense of the participant trying to make sense of their own experience in the interview (Smith and Osborn, 2008:53). Indeed, the practice of IPA is informed by hermeneutics (the theory of interpretation), the assumption being that humans are ‘sense-making creatures’ and so the accounts that they provide will reflect their attempts to make sense of their experience. This means that the researcher takes on a dual role; they employ the same sense-making skills and capacities as the participant, but they do so more ‘consciously and systematically’ (Smith et al., 2009: p3). As such, Brocki and Wearden (2006:96) note that analysis requires close interaction between the analyst and the text and that the researcher needs to make use of their own ‘interpretative resources’. This means that researchers’ need to take care when identifying themes to ensure that each theme is actually represented in the transcripts being analysed, and not a product of the researcher’s over interpretation (Smith et al., 1999).

The process by which the quality of qualitative research can be assessed has been widely debated and it has been acknowledged that it is typically less straightforward than that employed for quantitative work (e.g. Mason, 2012; Meyrick, 2006; Newton, Rothlingova, Gutteridge et al., 2012; Yardley, 2008). The relevance of traditionally positivist terms such as ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’ has been questioned and the term ‘trustworthiness’ has been suggested as being more appropriate. With this in mind, Yardley (2008) and Rolfe (2006) both emphasize the importance of the following principles when conducting high quality qualitative work: sensitivity to context; commitment and rigour; transparency and coherence; impact and importance. 
Similarly, Mason (2012) suggests that researchers should demonstrate the trustworthiness of their work by showing that:
“data generation and analysis have not only been appropriate to the research questions, but also thorough, careful, honest and accurate (as distinct from true or correct – terms which many qualitative researchers would, of course, wish to reject). At the very least this means that you must satisfy yourself and others that you have not invented or misrepresented your data, or been careless and slipshod in your recording and analysis of data.” (Mason 2012: 188)  

Since IPA has been described as “a creative process” and “not a matter of following a rule book” (Smith et al., 2009: 184), there is perhaps an even greater need to demonstrate the trustworthiness of this flexible and fluid method. In addition, the expectation that future IPA work will “push the boundaries further” (Smith et al., 2009: 185) makes it of paramount importance that researchers wishing to push boundaries do so whilst also demonstrating the trustworthiness of the analysis they present. 

Smith et al (2009:25) state that in the process of interpretation, “priority should be given to the new object, rather than to one’s preconceptions”, they suggest that one means of achieving this was outlined by Husserl (1929/1977) who developed a phenomenological method which involved bracketing taken-for-granted assumptions in order to be able to concentrate on the perception of the issue being researched. Smith and colleagues (2009:16) discuss this process and conclude that bracketing is “seen by IPA as an important part of the process.” However, they note that when we encounter data, we do not know which of our preconceptions may be brought to bear and so it is difficult to bracket preconceptions until one has actually engaged with the data. As such, although ‘bracketing’ prior experience in order to prevent it from colouring interpretation or making one’s preconceptions explicit (Lopez & Willis, 2004) is recommended to ensure trustworthiness, this is an issue which authors have tended to address in a superficial manner. Typically, the potential influence that the researcher’s preconceptions and/or experiences might play in the analytical process may be noted, but the process by which this might happen is seldom detailed. By way of example, Touroni and Coyle (2002:197) “hoped that the researchers would be sensitized to different aspects of the data set due to their respective interpretative positions as a heterosexual, female, counselling psychologist and a gay, male, social psychologist, thereby yielding a rich analysis.” Similarly Reynolds and Prior (2003: 787) suggest that the “distinctive yet complementary professional backgrounds helped to ensure that the interpretation of themes was not simply a manifestation of an individual researcher’s professional socialisation, and aided the transparency of the coding process.” How these transparency processes worked in practice was not elaborated upon, instead there was an unspoken assumption that the reader would ‘know.’ Others, (for example, Golsworthy and Coyle, 2001, Osborne and Coyle, 2003, Rodham, Rance and Blake, 2010) acknowledge but don’t explain the factors they think may have shaped their interpretation. Similarly, Turner, Barlow and Ilbery (2002) explicitly mention ‘trustworthiness’ and state that the first three (out of twelve) transcripts were independently examined following the analytical steps outlined in their article, but do not explain the process(es) they engaged in, whereas Chapman and colleagues (2007) stated that several members of the study team “read the transcripts, themes and subthemes and agreed with the final analysis” (p74), however information about the process of reaching agreement was not offered.1

Given the potential difficulty associated with first identifying and then suspending one’s beliefs, perhaps what is required is Le Vasseur’s (2003) assertion that researchers should become curious. When we become curious we assume that we do not know or understand the issue under study. In taking on this perspective, we become better able to question our prior knowledge and experience. Le Vasseur (2003:418) gives an example to show how we might achieve the development of a curious attitude:
If, out of our view, someone were to put an object inside a paper bag, the bag might act as a temporary bracket, because it could prevent us from knowing and labelling the object by sight. If we placed our hand into the bag and could not yet recognize the object, we would have a fresh experience of the object without the interference of our prior assumptions and knowledge. Thus, its qualities of roundness or roughness might become more apparent to us. Its contours, texture, and temperature would be part of our experience. Let us say that in a few moments, we recognized the object, and our prior knowledge came flooding back into consciousness. “Oh, it’s just a bird’s nest!” we might exclaim. However, in the short interval in which we were poised between perception and recognition, we would have possessed fresh experience.

She argues that it is this moment, where we are temporarily stripped of our assumptions by our curiosity that a new perception of the object under investigation might occur. Rather than temporarily suspending our beliefs and knowledge, Le Vassuer’s approach “involves attempts to get beyond the ordinary assumptions of understanding and stay persistently curious about new phenomena” (Le Vasseur, 2003: 419). It is our contention that the ability to develop a curious stance towards one’s data requires a researcher to engage in reflexivity and to become mindful of their role in the creation of knowledge. To do this, we need to self-monitor the “impact of our biases, beliefs and personal experiences on the research” (Berger, 2013:2). Reflexivity is further defined by Horsburgh (2003: 209) as the “active acknowledgement by the researcher that his/her own actions and decisions will inevitably impact on the meaning and context of the experience under investigation.” Similarly, Shaw (2010:234) describes reflexivity as “an explicit evaluation of the self.” In other words the process of reflexivity is an essential part of engaging with the double hermeneutic and rather than putting to one side (bracketing) one’s preconceptions, the focus is on becoming aware of them and their potential influence. 

Maintaining a curious stance and actively engaging in reflexivity are therefore key skills for doing IPA. As we have noted earlier in this paper, an underpinning assumption of IPA is that we use our interpretations to make sense of the data. What is important then is that as researchers, we maintain awareness of the factors that potentially influence the way in which we approach the data. In addition we must be explicit in our publications about the processes we have engaged in, and in effect provide our readers with an “audit trail” (Rolfe, 2006: 309). 
 
We suggest that many researchers who have employed IPA (ourselves included) have not clearly explained the process(es) they engaged in to ensure analytical trustworthiness. Indeed, Salmon (2003) notes that research findings can reflect the researcher as much as the researched, and Brocki and Wearden (2006:99) further highlight that this is something that tends to remain “tacitly, rather than openly acknowledged in many cases.” In this article, we aim to stimulate discussion about these issues by drawing on our experiences of engaging in a shared IPA analysis. In the next section of this article, we document and reflect on our individual and shared experience of the process we engaged in to ensure analytical trustworthiness and to reach consensus in an IPA analysis of data exploring the impact of illness on medical trainees and their subsequent career trajectory.

Background
We were involved in a research project exploring the health-seeking behaviour of medical trainees. Previous research had suggested that medical students were concerned that seeking care for personal illness would expose them to the risk of academic reprisal (Roberts, Warner, Lyketsos, Frank, Ganzini, & Carter et al., 2001), and that varying levels of concern about academic jeopardy were associated with different personal illnesses (Roberts, Warner, Rogers, Horwitz & Redgrave et al., 2005). Other researchers focusing on doctors found that their working arrangements reinforced a culture where distress was overlooked (Thompson, Cupples, Sibbett, et al, 2001) and where seeking appropriate help was discouraged (McKevitt & Morgan, 1997). The professional status of doctors also adversely affected the process of acknowledging illness (Thompson et al., 2001). This contributes to an ethos of invulnerability to illness which appears to take root early in doctors’ careers (Ingstad & Christe, 2001; Stein, 1990), and confirms the suggestion that doctors learn during training that ‘illness belongs to patients’ (McKevitt & Morgan, 1997). Our own previous research exploring the experiences of GP’s who had been unwell, identified that the culture of invulnerability was a crucial factor affecting their responses to their own ill health (Fox, Taylor, Harris, Rodham et al., 2010). In a subsequent study, we explored whether this culture was evident during doctors’ training and conducted a series of interviews with medical students who had themselves experienced personal illness (Fox, Doran, Taylor, Rodham, et al., 2011).

Shared Analysis of Data
For the current study eight interviews were conducted and transcribed verbatim by FF (transcripts did not include changes in speed of verbal response, intonations or emphasis, but were simply a direct transcription of the spoken words). Due to other commitments FF was unable to conduct the analysis of the transcripts. ND was therefore employed to carry out the analysis, which she did in line with the process described by Smith, Jarman and Osborn (1999). 

Although ND had not conducted the interviews, she listened to the audio recordings a number of times prior to engaging in an analysis of all the transcripts. After ND had analysed two of the transcripts, she invited FF and KR to independently analyse the same two transcripts with the intention of increasing trustworthiness of the analysis and reaching consensus about the themes. The anonymised transcripts were given in hard copy to FF and KR. All three qualitative researchers were part of a larger multi-disciplinary team working on the study exploring the impact of illness on medical trainees and were therefore familiar with the aims and objectives of the interviews. Each researcher carried out the first two steps of the analysis process as described by Smith et al., (1999) by searching for and naming themes. Thus, prior to analysis, one researcher (FF) had originally conducted and transcribed all the interviews. Another (ND) had listened to the recordings of the interviews and read hard copies of all the transcripts, and a third (KR) had read a hard copy of two transcripts. Once we had completed our independent analysis of the two transcripts, we met to consider our findings. This meeting was audio recorded. We began by discussing our general thoughts and impressions of the two interviews with a view to being explicit about any presuppositions which we felt may have affected our analytical approach. We considered it important to acknowledge the possibility that our own prior experience(s) and perceptions may have coloured our responses to any given participant. However, we were clear from the outset of the need to approach our respective contributions with the ‘curious stance’ suggested by Le Vasseur (2003). This enabled us to probe each others’ responses to the data in a non-threatening, open and interested manner. In the subsequent section we present our reflections on the process that we engaged in to ensure trustworthy analysis and achieve consensus.

Responses to the transcripts
It quickly became apparent that we had all responded differently to the participants in question. We draw from our responses to the first interview to illustrate how we navigated our way through the process of analysing the data. KR (reliant on the hard copy of the transcript) had felt that participant one had come across as someone who was ‘passive-aggressive’, reluctant to take responsibility for their own health and a ‘whiner’. FF (conducted and transcribed the original interviews) and ND (listened to the audio recordings and read the transcript of the interviews) had more empathy for this individual. We suggest that our contrasting impressions might be explained by the different levels at which we engaged in the research process and reflect on our different reactions: 
FF: “The participant’s emphasis on, or repetition of certain problems that were irritating for KR to read were to me triggers, reminding me how the participant had elaborated on key events to emphasise and make sense of her experience. My awareness of the unforgiving medical culture heightened my empathy for her personal difficulties and I was aware that being with this individual as she reconstructed her story stirred up a compassionate response in me”. 
The rapport which had developed through the interview combined with FF’s previous experience of talking to doctor’s about their own health had affected her approach to the initial stages of the analysis. In particular FF was able to recall the non-verbal communication which triggered her empathic response. Becoming aware of the response of the other researchers to the data reminded FF to maintain mindfulness about her own reflexivity within the process of analysis.  

Having grown up with a chronic condition, ND was aware that although this afforded her a degree of ‘insider’ knowledge with respect to the lived experience of ill-health, she was also mindful not to be hindered by what has been termed in the literature a ‘shared conceptual blindness’ (Blakeman, Mac Donald, Bower et al., 2006). ND recalled the first participant:
ND “This participant had suffered with a number of symptoms as part of a chronic condition gaining her the reputation of being “the sickest in the year.” Within this context, she then had an acute life-threatening illness episode. Her conditioned response from previous illness episodes was to push herself on regardless so as not to “let the team down” or be judged a “shirker,” yet this life-threatening episode forced an identity shift and a re-evaluation of this more stoic response. Having passed through several transitional phases: Trainee to newly qualified doctor; doctor to patient; chronic to acute illness, the interview afforded her with a safe space to not only disclose what was most personal and meaningful, but to work through and reconcile a number of conflicts, as she could vent her frustrations against what she described as “a culture of come in and work, no matter how sick you are!”
ND reflected that at the point we all met to discuss our shared analysis, she was fairly new to the team and was in fact meeting one of the team members (KR) for the first time. She found the discussion which unfolded fascinating; the influence of each person’s disciplinary background (anthropological, sociological and psychological), as well as the contrasting personal and professional life experiences that were brought to bear on our shared interpretative task was both thought provoking and insightful and raised the question concerning the extent to which our preconceptions or prior experiences may be modifying, enhancing or indeed intruding upon the data.
KR: “I felt some empathy for the health problems that this participant had experienced and the environment she was working in, but my overwhelming response was one of irritation. I was irritated because I felt that the participant was reluctant to take responsibility for managing their health issues. I was especially irritated by what I interpreted as self-centredness; the participant was so focused on how awful it was for her to be ill, that she seemed to have no awareness of the potential implications for her patients of her decision to continue to work. Indeed, she herself noted that had a colleague not forced her to go home, patient safety would have been put at considerable risk, with potential life threatening consequences for any patients under her ‘care’.” 

As someone who works in a hospital setting for part of the week KR was very aware of the difficulties that working in the NHS can bring. Although she was sympathetic towards the health problems this individual was experiencing, her over-riding response was one of irritation with this person’s apparent reluctance to take responsibility for their own actions. In the discussion with ND and FF she explored whether part of her reaction to the participant could have been influenced by an interaction earlier in the week with a group of undergraduates who were themselves reluctant to take responsibility for their own learning. In her clinical work KR is a reflective practitioner; she is mindful of her reaction(s) to clients and their stories; the discussion of these transcripts with ND and FF was an excellent opportunity to be mindful of the importance of directing that reflective practice towards her response to the participant as well as to the data.

As we discussed our different perceptions and reactions to the transcript it was evident how much could be gained, lost or altered through our various levels of engagement with the data: from actually interviewing a participant, listening to the recording or simply reading the typed transcript. The process of transcription; moving from the spoken word to the written transcript, can both illuminate and conceal the way in which narratives are constructed and may account for our varied responses to the interviewee in question.  

Reflections on the experience of shared analysis
We discovered that the process of adopting a curious stance in addition to reflexivity was important when discussing and attempting to reach consensus. Without embracing a more curious stance towards the data and an openness about our responses to it, we risked being unable to move beyond a desire to show that our interpretation was the most valid. FF recalls being: 
“surprised and perhaps even a little defensive, when one researcher (KR) declared that a particular participant had really annoyed her. Thinking back to the interview I recalled feeling a great deal of sympathy for this person as they talked about the struggle they had experienced. Where KR felt that the participant came across as whingeing, I had felt the build-up of frustration which played out as she told her story.”

To achieve consensus about themes we needed to move beyond our initial differences in reaction and this was facilitated by the ‘middle ground’ perspective of ND who had not met the participant in person (like KR) but who had listened to the audio recording (like FF). As our discussions progressed, KR was “relieved to hear that familiarity with the recorded interview enabled an alternative viewpoint; one in which it was apparent that this participant was actually aware of the implications of their decision to push on in spite of being ill.” Thus, employing Le Vasseur’s curious attitude enabled us to remain open to each others’ perspectives and thereby further explore the similarities and differences in the way that we were approaching and responding to the data, thereby enabling us to move towards consensus.

Naming Themes: In terms of coding, it was not uncommon to find that we had each assigned a different name or label to describe the same theme. In other words, what was labelled ‘pro-active support-seeking’ by one of us might be ‘self-efficacy’ by another. We were mindful that wrangling over code or theme names was of secondary importance to working out the complex and over-lapping relationships between themes and their content. Collaboratively working on this process was useful, as we were able to ensure that the emphasis of the analysis did not lean too heavily towards one researcher’s own background or interests. Instead, our shared efforts to reflect the interpretation offered by the participant in the interview offered the opportunity to view the data through more than one lens. 
Smith (2004:46) asserts that “hermeneutics centred in empathy and meaning recollection” comprise the major interpretive level of focus in IPA analysis. However he also suggests that IPA allows a “hermeneutics of questioning, of critical engagement” leading to an interpretation that participants themselves may be unlikely or unwilling to see or acknowledge. In our example this distinction was clear between the empathic approach of FF and ND and the more critical interpretation adopted by KR. Smith acknowledges that both stances can contribute to a “more complete understanding of the participant’s lived experience” (p.46). The challenge for us as a team of researchers, and for others like us, is to combine analytical approaches from an initial response which may be more emotional when reading the data, through to a more reflexive, curious, critical and speculative reflection.

This experience highlighted the extent to which we bring our own sensibilities to the analysis and led us to reflect on the extent to which listening, as opposed to simply reading the transcribed text, could affect our initial impressions. Confronted by the contrasting impressions formed by her colleagues with regards to the first participant, ND suggested that this could be in part due to the differing ways in which they had approached the data and by way of illustrating this point, she gave the following example from another participant’s interview transcript: 
 “If I had not listened to the interview first, I may well have missed the fact that certain things, which on first reading appeared provocative or unsympathetic, were actually relayed apologetically or even humorously with a self-deprecating or ironic tone. For example on one occasion, this particular medical trainee said he wanted to become a surgeon rather than a GP, because he only wanted to treat “real illness” and that he would not have had “the patience to treat people coming in with all sorts of problems.” By listening to the transcript, I was better equipped to pick up on the more subtle nuances – the hesitations, the pauses and laughter – so that when he put forward his preference for surgical practice in this way, I could recognise that this medical trainee was well aware of the fact that he was parodying a particular stereotypical view held within certain sectors of the medical profession. Having listened to the audio recording, the interviewee in this case came across as far more reflexive and self-aware than was apparent in the text of the transcript alone.

We believe that our experiences have shown that the practicality of making one’s preconceptions explicit at the start of the analytical process is difficult. Whilst we were aware that our backgrounds and respective areas of expertise might impact on our approach to the data, it was not until we came together to establish analytical consensus that a number of our preconceptions surfaced. Our experience supports the positions of Gadamer (1990/1960, cited by Smith et al., 2009: p 25) who argued that bracketing is “something which can only be partially achieved” and Smith and colleagues (2009) who suggest that the only way one ever gets to know what one’s preconceptions are is to begin the interpretation. We found that this process became even more transparent when we worked together as a group and actively questioned one another’s assumptions. As such, we suggest that although being both mindful of, (and attempting to bracket) one’s preconceptions regularly as part of the analytical process is useful, we firmly believe that adopting the ‘reflexive and curious attitude’ should take precedent; it is this which we consider enhances one’s receptiveness to alternative perspectives, and is an echo of Smith and colleagues (2009: p26) call for a “spirit of openness”.

The experience of engaging in a joint analysis of our data was one which we found utterly fascinating, for it exposed issues not documented by previous collaborative research. We were therefore ‘feeling our way,’ as we tried to ensure that our analysis contributed to a trustworthy interpretation of our participants’ experiences. It has become clear through the analytical process that without the context provided by audio recordings of interviews, it is much harder to bracket, be curious and reflexive about one’s own perspective. The context of the audio recording provides a cue to bring into awareness one’s preconceptions and potential biases which should be acknowledged. Listening to the interview enables so much more to be conveyed by the way in which a speaker uses their voice (intonation, volume and emphasis). Indeed, without the recording it may be much easier for the analyst to superimpose their own presuppositions or interpretative bias at the expense of that which the participant is trying to convey; this is irrespective of how much detailed annotation might be included on the transcript. Therefore, a key recommendation when collaboratively analysing interview data concerns the importance of ensuring that when one agrees to analyse a transcript, one should also listen to the recording of the interview. 

Unanswered questions and tentative solutions
Whilst our responses to the interviewees differed markedly, our coding of the transcripts was congruent. Indeed, we were pleasantly surprised to find that although we often assigned a different name to a theme; we agreed about the content of the theme. This meant that we did not face the issue of resolving a disagreement over the development of the themes. 

Other than noting that ‘consensus was reached,’ researchers seldom document the process(es) that they underwent to reach consensus and so there remains a lack of understanding as to how, or in what ways, any areas of disagreement were resolved: do they simply agree to disagree? If so, how might this affect the progression to the next level of analysis? Brocki and Wearden (2006:97) note that theme selection is not solely based on prevalence, but can be influenced by other factors, and so it is ever more important that researcher bias in selection of themes is minimised. With this in mind, we wonder whether it is natural to defer to the researcher in the team who is perceived to be the most experienced in IPA analysis (or the most frequently published). Do less experienced researchers sometimes concede that their interpretation is inferior or less ‘correct’ than their colleagues? Potential strategies for dealing with such challenges might be to return to the participant, asking whether a particular interpretation adequately or accurately represents their experience. However, when taking this strategy, it is important to be mindful of the possible impact of the double-hermeneutic. In other words, our interpretation as researchers may not be one that our participants are able or willing to see or acknowledge (see Mason, 2012 and Smith, 2004 for a more detailed discussion of this issue).

An alternative option is for researchers to present more than one version of analysis, thereby highlighting the areas where there was both agreement and disagreement amongst those engaged in the analysis of the data. After all, in hermeneutics - the branch of philosophy concerned with the science of interpretation upon which IPA is based - it is acknowledged that there will always be more than one reading of a text (Palmer, 1969; Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979). Perhaps a salient question from our experience is whether there is also more than one ‘reading’ i.e. interpretation of an audio recording? We leave these questions for future researchers to explore.

Conclusions and Recommendations
It was our intention to stimulate discussion by sharing our practical experience of exploring analytical trustworthiness and the process of reaching consensus. Smith and colleagues (2009) note that the IPA researcher is in essence adopting two positions; one which attempts to see the world from the perspective of the participant, and in effect stand in their shoes (the insider perspective). The other position is that of self-conscious and systematic explorer of the participant’s perspective (the researcher perspective). The second position requires the researcher to stand alongside the participant and in effect interrogate and interpret what the participant tells them. 

We set out to explore the health-seeking behaviour of medical trainees, however whilst analysing the data collected, a new research question was identified: how do IPA researchers ensure the trustworthiness of their analysis? In seeking an answer to this question, we, as IPA researchers, have simultaneously held parallel roles; that of the researcher and the researched. The interpretative position that runs through the epistemological underpinnings of IPA has been just as important in our own practice as we sought to understand the pursuit of trustworthiness and consensus in the analytical process. Maintaining the curious stance and open attitude was key to managing both the double-hermeneutic and the dual roles we held as researcher and researched, while we tried to unpick and understand the processes important in reaching consensus and ensuring trustworthiness. 

Although we have not entirely resolved the issue of how to reach consensus, we have shed some light on the ways in which interpreting data may be affected. It is not enough for researchers to state that transcripts were independently examined. More information is needed about this process and we would argue that all those involved in the analytical process, ought to contextualise their analysis by listening to the audio recordings of the interviews. Failure to do so makes the process of remaining curious and reflexive much harder. Our findings therefore have serious implications for the storage of research data. For example, keeping the original recordings for potential future secondary analysis of the data brings with it ethical complications because participants anonymity could be compromised, along with that of any other person or place mentioned in the interview. Identifying information is usually anonymised during transcription but a means of anonymising recordings is potentially required.

We finish with a summary of tips for those working collaboratively on the analysis of data. First, as we have mentioned above, all those involved in the analysis should listen to the audio recordings; without access to the enormously useful contextual data that such recordings provide, interpretations of the data can be biased. Second, we suggest that the researcher who conducted the interviews, shares any fieldwork notes they made after each interview in order to provide further context for fellow analysts. Third, we recognise that in calling for transparency we are also in effect calling for authors to use some of their precious word count to include a reflexive account. This is a wider issue that is yet to be resolved. However, Newton and colleagues (2012: 88) suggest one solution which we also endorse, that of making reflexive notes available online “in a forum detached from the journal article, yet referenced within it.” And finally we emphasise the importance of establishing a supportive environment where colleagues engaged in a shared analysis of the data can question and critically engage in one another’s interpretations. Teaching team members to take a curious stance, perhaps learning and employing the techniques inherent in motivational interviewing, will ensure that preconceptions and their potential influence on the analysis can be identified and acknowledged without researchers’ feeling threatened or becoming defensive. In addition, applying a more curious and reflexive approach to one’s own reactions to the data, rather than just directing curiosity towards the data is important. Indeed, acknowledging and incorporating contributions from each researcher, whether they are empathic or critical interpretations of the data will generate a more complete understanding of the participants lived experiences. 
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